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ADDITION OF DEFENDANTS BY THE
PENNSYLVANIA SCI. FA. ACTS
OF 1929 AND 1931
Much confusion has arisen in the attempted applica-
tion of the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929' as amended by the Act of
1931.2 Interpretation of the Act of 1929 is for the most
part settled law, but many problems which have arisen
under the amending act remain to be solved. We shall
first consider the effect of the Act of 1929 and then examine
the changes made by the amending act.
The Sci. Fa. Act of 1929 was passed by the legislature
at the instance of the Pennsylvania Bar Association. Its
object was "to enable a defendant to join in any action all
parties who are liable to or with him on that cause of
action.- 3 The words "scire facias" mean "that you make
known." The Act Provides as follows:
"AN ACT
"To regulate procedure where a defendant desires
to have joined as additional defendants persons whom
he alleges are liable over to him, or jointly or severally
liable with him, for the cause of action declared on.
"Section 1. Be it enacted, &c., That any defend-
ant, named in any action, may sue out, as of course, a
writ of scire facias to bring upon the record as an addi-
tional defendant any other person alleged to be liable
over to him for the cause of action declared on, or
jointly or severally liable therefor with him, with the
same force and effect as if such other had been orig-
inally sued, and such suit shall continue, both before
and after judgment, according to equitable principles,
although at common law, or under existing statutes,
1p. L. 479.
2P. L. 663.
8From report of Civil Law Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar As-
sociation. (34th Annual Report of Pennsylvania Bar Association, pages
42 and 43.) See also Gilkey v. Montag, 13 D. & C. 717, 718.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff could not properly have joined all such
parties as defendants.
"APPROVED-The 10th day of April, A. D. 1929."
THE VINNACOMBE AND PITTSBURGH BANK CASES
The two leading cases interpreting this act are the well
known cases of Vinnacombe et ux. v. Philadelphia, et al.4
and First National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Baird.5 The form-
er case was one of trespass where the plaintiff sued the City
of Philadelphia for inj.tries caused by a defective sidewalk.
The city, by means of this act, brought upon the record, as
additional defendants, the landlord and tenant of the prem-
ises. the parties who would be liable over to the city if a
recovery were had against it in the pending suit. The
constitutionality of the act was upheld. Mr. Justice Simp-
son, in writing the opinion for the court, held as follows:
"In construing it, two things are plainly apparent:
(1) the act is a remedial one. Its purpose is to avoid a
multiplicity of suits; to compel every interested person
to appear and defend the action by plaintiff; and to
save the original defendant from possible harm result-
ing from loss of evidence as might result if compelled
to await the end of the suit before proceeding against
those who were primarily liable in whole or in part.
Hence, the statute is to be liberally construed to ad-
vance the legislative purpose. Fulton Farmers Assn.
v. Bomberger, 262 Pa. 43, 47; Dugan v. Dugan, 291
Pa. 556. (2) Nothing in the act shows the slightest
intention to affect plaintiffs in such suits. Consequent-
ly, the adding of additional defendants will give no
higher right to plaintiffs than they had before. As to
them, the action proceeds against the original defend-
ant only, exactly as it would have done if the addi-
tional defendants had not been named, except that the
Court below, in the exercise of a sound discretion.
should give to the original defendant, who acts
promptly, a reasonable extra time to bring the addi-
tional defendants upon the record, before being




lows, that no question can arise as to an implied repeal
of the statute of limitations as between the additional
defendants and plaintiff."e
The remainder of the Vinnacombe case is devoted to
the procedure to be followed. It is to be noted that the act
wisely leaves this matter to the courts. The Vinnacombe
case sets forth in detail the substantial form for the praecipe
and writ which must be followed. 7
The Pittsburgh Bank case is one of assumpsit in which
the accommodation maker of a note was sued by the holder.
The defendant caused a scire facias to be issued against
the accommodated or real party in interest. Plaintiff entered
judgment against the defendant for want of an affidavit of
defense and the court held that the separate issue between
the original defendant and the -additional defendant who
was liable over should be separately tried, though under the
same term and number as the original case.8
The Scire Facias Act of 1929 was not intended to give
the plaintiff any additional right, or to delay him in the
prosecution of his suit, except insofar as it may be neces-
sary to accomplish the purpose of the act, by the court's
giving to defendant, who acts promptly. a reasonable time
to bring the additional defendants upon the record, before
being required to file an affidavit of defense or plea. Con-
sequently, the Pittsburgh Bank case holds that notwith-
standing the pendency of sci. fa. proceedings, the plaintiff
is entitled to judgment for want of an affidavit of defense,
if none is filed within the time prescribed by rule or by an
extension thereof allowed by the court. Were the court to
have held otherwise would have been contrary to what the
court held was the inherent purpose of the act, viz. no ad-
ditional rights to the plaintiff but the right to the defendant
who acts promptly to bring upon the record those whom
he alleges are liable to him for the cause of action declared
on by the plaintiff. The issue created by the scire facias is
Vinnacombe et ux. v. Philadelphia. et al., 297 Pa. 564, 569.
Ibid. 571, 572 and 573.
OFIrst National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Baird, 300 Pa. 92.
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strictly between the two classes of defendants only and has
no bearing whatsoever upon the issue between the plaintiff
and the original defendant. Mr. Justice Simpson, in writ-
ing the opinion in the Vinnacombe case, says:
"As to them (plaintiffs) the action proceeds
against the original defendant only, exactly as it
would have done if the additional defendants had not
been named. ....... 
A defendant is not obliged to avail himself of the pro-
cedure of the Act of 1929; if he prefers, he may proceed in
accordance with the earlier practice. Before passage of
the act, a defendant could only notify the third party,
wholly or partially liable to him, to appear and defend, but
could not proceed against that third party until the prin-
cipal suit was decided. As the court in the Pittsburgh Bank
case pointed out, this delay might be disastrous and might
result, when the new suit came to be tried, in his inability
to prove the notice to appear and defend, or might find the
primary debtor beyond the reach of process, o dead or
bankrupt.1 To this list of advantages might be added those
which were outlined by the court in the Vinnacombe case,
as follows: Avoiding a multiplicity of suits, and saving the
original defendant from possible harm resulting from loss of
evidence, as might result if compelled to await the end of
the suit before proceeding against those who were primarily
liable in part or in whole.
PLEADING ESSENTIALS
The act itself does not give us the forms of pleading to
be used. These were supplied by the Supreme Court in the
Vinnacombe case', and must be followed by the practition-
er in much the same manner as one follows rules of court.
Vinnacombe et ux. v. Phila. et al., 297 Pa. 564, 569.
10First Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v, Baird, 300 Pa. 92, 98,
11297 Pa. 564.
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The Supreme Court based its right to formulate these rules
upon Section 3 of the Act of June 16, 1836.12
Mr. Justice Simpson, in writing the opinion of the court
in the Vinnacombe case, 13 formulated the praecipe for the
writ of scire facias which must be prepared by the attorney
for the defendant. The actual facts upon which defendant
bases his claim regarding the liability of the additional de-
fendant or defendants to him must be set forth in the
praecipe, They must be sufficiently averred so as to give
fair notice to the additional defendant, but the legislature
never intended that a full, complete and formal statement
of claim be presented.4 It should, however, be self-
sustaining and must disclose the essentials of a cause of
action. 15 It is not necessary that a sworn statement of the
original defendant's claim over against the additional de-
fendant be filed .with the praecipe,"' although as a matter
of actual practice many attorneys prefer attaching the
usual form of client's affidavit to the praecipe.
It is essential that the praecipe set forth the manner
in which the additional defendant is alleged to be liable to
the original defendant, i.e. whether jointly liable with the
original defendant, severally liable with the original de-
fendant, or liable over to the original defendant. The Act
of 1929, as amended by the Act of 1931, permits the writ of
scire facias to issue on any one of the above allegations as
well as the additional allegation of sole liability."7 In the
recent case of Yellow Cab Co. v. Rodgers et al., 8 Judge
Thompson of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
12p. L. 784. Chief Justice Frazer dissented on the ground that the
rule-making authority is exclusively in the Common Pleas. See also
opinion of Mr. Justice Simpson in the Pittsburgh Bank case, 300 Pa.
92, 101.
18297 Pa. 564, 571.
14McCullom et al. Stiefel, 80 Pitts. Legal Journal, 13; Appel et
ux. v. Phila. et al., 17 D. & C. 337, 338.
15Folcroft Borough v. Lenhart No. 2. 14 D. & C. 535, 538.
leForgang v. Phila. et al., 13 D. & C. 431, 432.
"?The effect of the Act of 1931 will be discussed infra,
1861 Fed. 2nd, 729,
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for the Third District held that failure to aver the proper
liability of the additional defendant to the original defend-
ant is fatal. This decision is far-reaching. The reasoning
of the court was expressed as follows:
"It is conceivable that an original defendant might
set forth in a writ of scire facias any or all of these
(four) grounds for adding a defendant to an action
already instituted. The original defendant in this case,
however, chose to restrict its cause of action against
the additional defendant to the single allegation that
the additional defendant was alone liable. It would be
contrary to the ordinary rules of pleading to conclude
that. although the original defendant's case was based
on the theory of the sole liability of the additional de-
fendant, it might at the trial change its theory to some
other form of liability than that pleaded. In Shaw v.
Megargee, 307 Pa. 447, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania did not deem an allegation of sole liability
inter-changeable with allegations of joint and several
liability or liability over. See also the decision of this
Court of October 24, 1932, in Yellow Cab Co. of Phila.
v. Graham and Smythe."19
It is therefore submitted that if the facts upon which
the sci. fa. are based may not make out a prima facie case
of the one type of liability of the additional defendant to
the original defendant, that tht original defendant protect
himself by having his praecipe allege sufficient grounds of
liability.
The original defendant should serve upon the addi-
tional defendant with the sci. fa. a copy of plaintiff's state-
ment of claim.2 0 In addition to the copy of the plaintiff's
statement of claim, the original defendant should set forth
in his praecipe for sci. fa. a copy of any bond, contract or
writing which he relies upon to establish the liability of the
additional defendant to him if such bond, contract or writ-
ing does not appear in the plaintiff's statement of claim.2
19Yellow Cab Co. of Phila. v. Graham et al., 16 D. f C. 238. Af-
firmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 61 Fed. 2nd, 666.
2Forgang v. Phila. et al., 13 D. & C. 431, 432.
21School District of Eddystone v. Lewis et al., 101 Pa. Superior
Ct. 588, 590; Folcroft Boro. v. Lenhart No. 2. 14 D. & C. 435.
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If the praecipe is not sufficiently specific or does not
contain a copy of the necessary instrument, bond, contract
or writing, the remedy is to rule the original defendant for
more specific averments in his praecipe or by motion to
strike it off. It should not be done by affidavit of defense
raising a question of law.
2 2
It is to be noted that the writ of sci. fa. is in the nature
of an action in assumpsit and the additional defendant
should file an affidavit of defense to the original defendant's
allegations as contained in the praecipe. Failure to so file
an affidavit of defense within fifteen days may result in
judgment being entered against the additional defendant
and in favor of the original defendant.13 This judgment
may be taken by the original defendant against the addi-
tional defendant either before or after judgment has been
entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the original de-
fendant. 24 If the final judgment is in favor of the original
defendant as against the plaintiff, the judgment against the
additional defendant, if one had been entered, should be
stricken off on motion. 25 But if it is adverse to both the or-
iginal and additional defendants, plaintiff, upon receiving
satisfaction from the original defendant, should mark the
suit to the use of the latter, and the additional defendant
will be liable to and execution may issue against him at the
instance of the original defendant, for the proportion of the
recovery adjudged to be payable by the additional defend-
ant to the original defendant, without any further proceed-
ings being required to establish such liability.26
Writs of sci. fa. may be amended by leave of court.27
-2School District of Eddystone v. Lewis et al., 101 Pa. Superior Ct.
588, 590.
23Vinnacombe et ux. v. Phila. et al., 297 Pa. 564, 572.
24School District of Eddystone v. Lewis et al., 101 Pa. Superior Ct.
583, 586, 590.
2-Vinnacombe et ux. v. Phila. et al., 297 Pa. 564, 574.
281bid.
27Ibid.; Cohen v. Phila. Rural Transit Co. et al., 13 D. & C. 465.
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WHO MAY USE SCI. FA.
The writ of sci. fa. authorized by the Acts of 1929 and
1931 is available to defendants whether the plaintiff's suit
is in trespass or assumpsit.28 The words of the act "in any
action" have also been held to apply to suits in equity as
well as actions at law.29 In fact there is no limitation in the
act that will prevent a defendant in a trespass action from
issuing a writ of sci. fa. to bring upon the record one who
is liable over to him in assumpsit. 0 The liability, however,
must arise out of the same transaction. It must be remem-
bered that the clear intent of the act was to determine the
rights of all parties having any interest or liability in the
suit in question in one action, regardless of any technical
questions of procedure, and to avoid a multiplicity of
suits.8'
It is also well settled that the Acts of 1929 and 1931
are available not only to the original defendant but to any
additional defendants joined by sci. fa. In the Vinnacombe
case, the court said that the purpose of the act was to avoid
a multiplicity of suits and to compel every interested person
to appear and defend the action by plaintiff. Section I of
the Act of 1929 provides that "Any defendant, named in
any action, may sue out, as of course, a write of scire facias
to bring upon the record as an additional defendant any
other person , . " (Italics ours).
In the case of Amandeo et ux. v. Philadelphia,2 the
plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia for damages sus-
tained by one of the plaintiffs when in the act of alighting
from a trolley car, her foot went into a large hole or depres-
sion. The City of Philadelphia sci. fa.'d one Ford, alleging
it had granted him a permit to repair a sewer lateral and
that the excavation into which plaintiff stepped resulted
from his defective work. Ford, the additional defendant,
28SVinnacombe et ux. v. Phila. et a]., 297 Pa. 564, 570.
29McCullom v. Stiefel, 80 Pitts. Legal Journal, 13.
3Appel et ux. v. Phila. et al., 17 D. & C. 337, 338.
1I1bid.
8216 D, & C. 106.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sci. fa.'d the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company as addi-
tional defendant, alleging it was either jointly or severally
liable with him or solely liable to the plaintiff by reason of
its negligence in stopping the car at a point dangerous for
passengers to alight. The Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company moved to quash the last sci. fa. on the ground
that the only defendant who is given the right under the
Act of 1929 is the original defendant. The court held that
a writ of scire facias may be issued under the Act of 1929
by a defendant joined by a similar writ, as well as by the
original defendant in the suit, so as to bring in an additional
defendant alleged to be liable on the cause of action de-
clared on by plaintiff.
But a party who is already on the record as a defend-
ant cannot be brought in again by writ of scire facias. as an
"additional defendant.''33 The Supreme Court reasoned
that one already a defendant could not be an "additional
defendant" or "third party" as defined in the Pittsburgh
Bank case.34 The court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Simp-
son explains how one of the defendants may safeguard his
interests in such a case. If the plaintiff attempts to discon-
tinue the action as far as it concerns one of the defendants,
it then becomes the duty of the trial court, if moved by the
other defendant, to do one of two things: either to strike
off the discontinuance, or to give that defendant a sufficient
time to issue a sci. La. against the other defendant, which
will then be an "additional defendant," and to put the case
at issue under the statute. To deny this right would de-
prive the defendant of his statutory right under the act.
A discontinuance is presumed to be entered by leave of
court, and will be stricken off in all cases where it would
be inequitable to permit it to remain.A5
The defendant is also protected as to a non-suit in
favor of the other defendant. If the plaintiff offers no evi-
dence against one of the defendants, the trial court should
33Shapiro v. Phila. et al., 306 Pa. 216, 219.
84First Nat. Bank. of Pittsburgh v. Baird, 300 Pa. 92, 97.
3 5 Shapiro v. Phila. et al., 306 Pa. 216, 230.
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allow the defendant to offer evidence to show that the other
defendant was liable (primarily, jointly, or since the amend-
ment of 1931, solely) for the tort complained of before en-
tering a non-suit or directing a verdict in favor of the other
defendant. This is not a denial of the second defendant's
rights inasmuch as there is no legal right to a non-suit after
the plaintiff has rested his case, nor can the failure to grant
it be assigned as error.36 But a defendant is entitled to have
binding instructions in his favor after the evidence of all
the parties has been given, if at that time it would not
justify a verdict against him. The same rule holds true as
to judgment non obstante veredicto. Nor does the absence
of pleadings as between the defendants where they are sued
jointly by the plaintiff make any difference as the Supreme
Court has said that the Trial Judge can, and, in such a con-
tingency, should require the jury to make a special finding
regarding the primary liability as between the two defend-
ants.
37
The only disadvantage is that where the plaintiff has
sued the defendants jointly, the issues between the defend-
ants cannot be determined prior to the trial between the
plaintiff and the original defendant as might be done if the
one defendant were an additional defendant. If this is im-
portant enough to warrant correction, it will have to be
done by legislation.
38
The only other limitations affecting the Sci. Fa. Acts
are those which deal with questions of jurisdiction. It will
be noted, however, that neither the Act of 1929 nor the
amending Act of 1931 extend, alter or amend the acts relat-
ing to the service of process in actions at law.3° The juris-
dictional limitations arise solely from limitations present in
statutes relating to service of process.
It is therefore impossible for a writ of sci. fa. under the




39Kincade et al. v. Maxwell, 15 D. 6 C. 445, 446.
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upon the additional defendant in a county other than that
in which the action was brought or where the cause of
action arose."
In the case of Gromley ,. Berger,41 the plaintiff institut-
ed suit in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, against the de-
fendant for injuries sustained by her in an automobile col-
lision. She obtained service and the defendant directed a
scire facias to be issued against another, alleging joint and
several liability. The Sheriff, unable to serve the additional
defendant in his county, deputized the sheriff of another
county. On petition of the additional defendant to strike
off the writ and set aside the service, it was alleged and ad-
mitted that the automobile collision occurred in New Jersey.
The court held that the Act of 1929 did not authorize serv-
ice out of the jurisdiction nor did it extend the jurisdiction
of the court over one who is not served in the county where
the collision occurred or where the writ issued.
Act No. 125, known as the Baldi Bill, was passed in
the 1933 Session of the Legislature and signed by the Gov-
ernor on May 18th. This amends the Act of 1929
as amended, by providing for service of process on an added
defendant in counties other than that within which the
action was instituted, by the sheriff of the county in which
the action was instituted deputizing the sheriff of the county
wherein such added defendant resides or where service may
be had upon him under the existing laws of this Common-
wealth in like manner as process may now be served in the
proper county.
Another jurisdictional limitation of the Act of 1929 and
its amendment is contained in Kincade et al. v. Maxwell.42
An attempt was made in the case to join as an additional
defendant by sci. fa. a corporation by means of service upon
one of its officers within the county where suit was institut-
'0 Gormley v. Berger. 15 D. & C. 117, 118.
"Ibid.
4215 D. 6 C. 445.
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ed. The court held that inasmuch as the corporation had
no office within the jurisdiction of the court and that all of
its business transactions and assets were located in other
counties, the common law rule exempting the corporation
from suit in such county was applicable.
An exceedingly interesting federal jurisdictional
problem arises where a case instituted in the State Courts
is removed to the Federal Courts by reason of a diversity
of citizenship as between the original defendant and the
additional defendant and where the amount involved is in
excess of $4,000. No reported case can be found as author-
ity for a solution of the problem that is here presented. The
State Court is faced with three possible courses: (1) split-
ting the case (in manner apparently authorized in the
Vinnacombe and Pittsburgh Bank cases) 4 and sending to
the Federal Court only the issue as between the two defend-
ants, there being no diversity of citizenship as between
plaintiff and the original defendant, or (2) sending to the
Federal Court the entire record, or (3) refusing to send the
record and retaining it in the State Court."
The corollary situation is found where a case is re-
moved to the Federal Court because of diversity of citizen-
ship existing between the plaintiff and the original defend-
ant and the latter by sci. fa. brings in additional defendant
43 See notes 4 and 5 supra.
44For interesting discussion of this problem as well as a general
article on the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929, see excellent article by Warwick
Potter Scott in January, 1931 issue of University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Vol. 79, No. 3, at pages 310, 311. Mr. Scott observes that by
adopting the first course, a cumbersome and unsatisfactory result would
follow, while the third course, if chosen, would be a denial of the con-
stitutional rights of the foreign corporation joined as additional defend-
ant. Mr. Scott suggests that the only practical result would seem to be
that of quashing the writ of sci. fa. upon motion of the additional de-
fendant which would perforce exclude from the scope of the Sci. Fa.
Act, cases where diversity of citizenship exists between the two classes
of defendants only and where there is nothing that would give the
United States Courts jurisdiction of the issue between the plaintiff and
the original defendant and where the amount involved is not less than
$4,000.
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who has no diversity of citizenship as to the plaintiff. This
was the situation in Fisher v. Yellow Cab Co. 45 Judge Dick-
inson of the District Court, in analyzing the case, stated:
"If the 'additional defendant' had been made a de-
fendant either alone or -jointly with the original de-
fendant named, the cause could not have been re-
moved, or, if inadvertently brought here, would be
remanded ........
but
"This question turns, as we view it, upon the other
question of who are the parties to the action. There
are, as we understand the rules of the State Courts,
two cases to be tried. Although tried by the same jury
and under the same evidence, they are as distinct as if
made the subject of separate suits. One is by the plain-
tiff against the original defendant. If this is determ-
ined in favor of the defendant, there is nothing more
to be done than to record the verdict. If, however,
this is determined in favor of the plaintiff, then the jury
determines as between the original defendant and the'additional defendant' who is the responsible party,
precisely as would have been done before the Act of
1929 if the original defendant had been sued, had paid
the judgment and had brought suit against the 'addi-
tional defendant' to recoup.
' '4
The court commented on the size of the job thus im-
posed upon court and jury and concluded that the question
of jurisdiction must be decided against the "additional de-
fendant" and that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court is
not ousted by the joinder as defendant of one whose resi-
dence is the same as that of the plaintiff.
There is another practical limitation in the use of the
Sci. Fa. Acts of 1929 and 1931. Both the Vinnacombe and
Pittsburgh Bank cases 47 are based upon the situation ot
liability over. Liability over of the additional defendant to
the original defendant-is most commonly found in "street
cases" where the property owner is liable over to the munic-
4516 D. & C. 251.
461bid. 252.
'7See notes 4 and 5 supra.
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ipality, in negotiable instrument cases where the additional
defendant is a prior endorser to the original defendant, and
in cases of independent contractors whose work is alleged
to have caused plaintiff's loss and for which damage the
additional defendant under his contract is responsible to the
original defendant. For such cases the Sci. Fa. Acts have
not had difficult application.
However, in the situation involving joint liability, there
have appeared many difficulties, many of which have not
been definitely settled. The only basis in Pennsylvania for
the right of the original defendant against an additional
joint defendant is the right of contributionship. In the case
of Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Company,'8  Mr. Justice
Schaffer stated that the operation of the doctrine of contri-
butionship among joint defendants is confined solely to
cases involving non-wilful torts and that its only applica-
tion is that of where the plaintiff obtains a judgment jointly
against the two tort feasors, the one of the two paying the
entire amount of the judgment is entitled to have the same
marked to his use and may proceed to recover back from
the other judgment debtor one-half of what was paid.
The Act of 1929 as amended by 1931 purports to give
the original defendant the right to join as additional de-
fendants all parties jointly liable with the original defend-
ant. It will be readily seen that the doctrine of contribu-
tionship would have to be extended if it is to be applied to
joint defendants in which no judgment against either has
as yet been recovered.4
9
48292 Pa. 354. See also Bailey v. Lavine et al., 302 Pa. 273; Gilkey
v. Montag, 13 D. & C. 717. Two excellent articles have recently ap-
peared in current publications, viz. "Contribution Between Wrong-
doers", (Pennsylvania law), Vol. 34 Dickinson Law Review, January,
1930, pages 123-131, by Honorable Fred S. Reese; and "Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tort Feasors," (general law), University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, December, 1932, pages 130-159, by Robert A.
Leflar.
49 See discussion of Warwick Potter Scott on this subject in Jan-
uary, 1931 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pages 311-323.
Mr. Scott sees no reason why. this doctrine should not be extended so
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If the joint tort feasors stand on an equal footing as far
as the standard of negligence is concerned, there is appar-
ently no real difficulty encountered. Where, however, the
measure or standard of one of the joint feasors is greater
than that of the other, we are faced with the dilemma of
either adopting the doctrine of comparative negligence or
are prevented from using the sci. fa. in such cases. The
doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in
Pennsylvania and this doctrine with its refinements and
complications was certainly not intended by the Legislature
in the Sci. Fa. Act to have supplanted our well established
doctrine of negligence and contributory negligence. As
was ably developed by Warwick Potter Scott,5 the act is
entitled "An Act to regulate procedure ". . and was
never intended to destroy the present substantive law of
negligence and contributory negligence.
It is therefore submitted that the Sci. Fa. Acts cannot
be applied to situations where the liability of the joint tort
feasors is of a different grade. This view was reached in
the case of Cohen v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Company
et al." In this case the original defendant brought upon the
record the City of Philadelphia by means of sci. fa. The
City employed the plaintiff as a fireman and he was injured
in the course of his employment by reason of a collision
between the fire truck and trolley of the original defendant.
The original defendant's liability to the plaintiff was based
on the theory of ordinary negligence, while that of the City
was based upon that outlined in the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law.
Under the doctrine of the Goldman case5 2 the Sci. Fa.
Acts of 1929 and 1931 cannot be successfully maintained
unless the original defendant can show in cases of joint
liability that a right of contribution between him and the
as to include the situation as provided in the Act of 1929 and amended
by Act of 1931 providing the joint tort feasors stand in pari delicto.
5 0.niversity of Pennsylvania Law Review, ibid.
5113 D. & C. 465.
52Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.; 292 Pa. 354.
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additional defendant as joint tort feasors exists.
TIME FOR USING SCI. FA.
The act is silent on the time in which a scire facias to
bring in additional defendants must issue.As Consequently,
rules have been adopted by some of the courts requiring the
issuance of a writ within a certain number of days after ser-
vice of the statement of claim.
Every court of record has inherent power to make
rules for the transaction of its business. The only limita-
tion of the power is that they must not be contrary to law
or unreasonable.
4
A rule of court requiring that a scire facias to bring in
additional defendants under the Act of 1929 must issue
within thirty days after service of the statement of claim
was held to be not a reasonable regulation of the procedure
prescribed by that act and that in such cases sixty days
should be prescribed subject to extension by the court for
cause shown.55 The appellant contended that not only was
the thirty-day time limit unreasonable but that the rule was
invalid because it was an abridgement of a right conferred
by the Act of 1929 to bring action against the additional
defendant within the period of time prescribed by the
statute of limitations. Mr. Chief Justice Frazer, in writing
the opinion for the court, clearly and logically rebutted this
contention and held that mere failure to comply with the
rule cannot affect a defendant's primary right to seek com-
pensation or reimbursement from a third party, for whose
act or default he has been held responsible, nor can it pre-
vent an action to recover the amount of the judgment
where the relations between the defendant and such third
party are governed by contract so as to give rights for a
claim for indemnification. The court again reiterated as
follows:
5sWeinstock v. Phila. et al., 17 D. & C. 411.




"The Act of 1929 was intended to expedite pro-
cedure by avoiding a multiplicity of suits, and it con-
fers undoubted benefits upon defendants who pursue
the remedy indicated therein: but it does not alter the
rights which existed previous to its passage. Defend-
ants who prefer to follow the old methods or who fail
to avail themselves of the benefits of the act within a
reasonably proper time are not thereby prejudiced
within the period of the statute of limitations."
An additional defendant brought in by writ of scire
facias may raise the defense of the statute of limitations by
a rule to quash. After the statute of limitations has run
-against an action by the plaintiff against such additional
defendant, the original defendant has no right to bring in
upon the record by sci. fa. the additional defendant.56
While no time limitation is set forth in the statute, in
the absence of a court rule, the original defendant desiring
to proceed tinder the Act of 1929 must act promptly.5 7
CHALLENGES
In this connection, it might be well to state that each
defendant having an antagonistic interest at the trial is en-
titled to four peremptory challenges. 5S
NON-SUIT
It was pointed out in the Shapiro case 59 that the trial
court should allow the original defendant to offer evidence
to show that the additional defendant is liable before a non-
suit or directed verdict can be entered in favor of the ad-
ditional defendant. However, the additional defendant is
entitled to have binding instructions in his favor after the
evidence of all parties has been given, if at that time there
56Malone et ux. v. Union Paving Co. et al., 16 D. & C. 644; Shaw
et al. v. Megargee (et al.), 307 Pa. 447, 451.
57First National Bank of Pittsburgh, 300 Pa. 92, 97.
58Act of March 29, 1860, P. L. 344, Section 1, as interpreted in the
light of the Joint Suit Act of June 29, 1923, P. L. 981 and the two Sci.
Fa. Acts. Shaw et al. v. Megargee (et al.), 307 Pa. 447,
59Shapiro v. Phila. et al., 306 Pa. 216.
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is not sufficient evidence as would justify a verdict against
him, and the same is true of judgment non obstante vere-
dicto.
It has also been previously noted that where the sci.
fa. to bring in the additional defendant alleges merely that
the additional defendant was solely liable, the court may
enter a non-suit or direct a verdict for the additional de-
fendant as to whom the original defendant had not made
out a prima facie case of sole liability.
60
VERDICT
The Supreme Court has suggested that in all cases
where the jury is called upon to determine the relative
rights of litigants, especially where if one defendant is
liable and another is not, or one, if liable, may have a right
of recovery over against another, that the jury, in addition
to rendering a general verdict, be called upon to answer
specifically definite questions submitted to them, with leave
to the court to mould the verdict in keeping with the ans-
wers returned.61
If, at the trial, the jury's verdict is in favor of the orig-
inal defendant, they need go no further; but if they find in
favor of the plaintiff, they should also specify in their ver-
dict whether or not the additional defendant is liable over
to the original defendant for the amount awarded to the
plaintiff and the extent of such liability. The court has a
right to grant a new trial to, or to enter judgment non ob-
stante veredicto, in favor of any one of the parties, with-
out disturbing the other verdict in the case. Whenever the
final judgment is in favor of the original defendant, the
judgment against the additional defendant, if one has been
entered, should be stricken off on motion.
6 2
"0Yellow Cab Co. v. Rodgers et al., 61 Fed. 2nd, 729.
6 1Malone et ux. v. Union Paving Co. et al., 306 Pa. 111, 120,
62Vinnacombe et ux. v. Phila. et al.. 297 Pa. 564, 573.
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EFFECT OF SCI. FA. ACTS UPON PENDING LITIGATION
Litigation existing at the time of the passage of the Act
of 1929 was subject to its terms because the act is proced-
ural in its nature,63 but a writ issued by virtue of the Act of
1929 and the amending Act of 1931 is void if issued before
the effective date of the act or its amendment. 6" The latter
Sci. Fa. Act was adopted June 22, 193165 but because of
the Act of May 17, 1929, P. L. 1808,66 it did not go into
effect until September- 1, 1931.
It therefore appears that the Sci. Fa. Act of 1931 also
applied to litigation existing at the time providing that the
writ authorized by the act did not issue before September
1, 1931,
EFFECT OF THE ACT OF 1931
The Act of 1929 was amended by the Act of 1931 to
read as follows:
"AN ACT
"To regulate procedure where a defendant desires
to have joined, as additional defendants, persons whom
he alleges are alone liable or liable over to him, or
jointly or severally liable with him. for the cause of
action declared on, and providing for entry of judg-
ments against such additional defendants.
"Section 2. That section one of said act is here-
by amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. Be it enacted, &c., That any defend-
ant, named in any action, may sue out, as of course, a
writ of scire facias to bring upon the record, as an ad-
ditional defendant, any other person alleged to be alone
liable or liable over to him for the cause of action de-
clared on, or jointly or severally liable therefor with
him, with the same force and effect as if such other
63Ibid. 570.
64Shaw et al. v. Megargee (et al.), 307 Pa. 447. 452.
sop. L. 663.
GsThis date applies since no other date was "specified in the Act
(of 1931) itself."
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had been originally sued; and such original defendant
shall have the same rights in securing service of said
writ as the plaintiff in the proceedings had for service
of process in said cause. Where it shall appear that
an added defendant is liable to the plaintiff, either alone
or jointly with any other defendant, the plaintiff may
have verdict and judgment or other relief against such
additional defendant to the same extent as if such
defendant had been duly summoned by the plaintiff and
the statement of claim had been amended to include
such defendant, and as if he had replied thereto deny-
ing all liability.
"'Upon the joinder of additional defendants
tinder the terms of this act, such suit shall continue, both
before and after judgment, according to equitable prin-
ciples, although at common law, or under existing
statutes, the plaintiff could not properly have joined all
such parties as defendants.
"APPROVED-The 22d day of June, A. D.
1931 ."
It will be noted that sole liability is added by the Act
of 1931 to the classifications of liability as set forth in the
preceding act. It was not possible under the Act of 1929
for the defendant to assert such a right67 The original de-
fendant or any additional defendant can now sci. fa. an
additional defendant or defendants alleging one or more of
the following grounds of liability on the part of the defend-
ant to be added: sole liability to the plaintiff, joint liability
with the original defendant or defendant issuing sci. fa.,
several liability with the original defendant or defendant
issuing sci. fa., and/or liability over to the original defend-
ant or additional defendant issuing sci. fa. Much doubt
exists as to the proper interpretation of that part of the
amending act which reads as follows:
"Where it shall appear that an added defendant is
liable to the plaintiff, either alone or jointly with any
other defendant, the plaintiff may have verdict and
67Shaw et al. v. Megargee (et at.), 307 Pa. 447, 452; King v.
Equitable Gas Co., 307 Pa. 287, 291; Vinnacombe et ux. v. Phila. et al.,
297 Pa. 564; Graham v. Yellow Cab. Co. et al., 16 D. & C. 238, 240--
affirmed In 61 Fed. 2nd, 666; Folcroft v, Lenhart, 14 D. & C. 535,
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judgment or other relief against such additional de-
fendant to the same extent as if such defendant had
been duly summond by the plaintiff and the statement
of claim had been amended to include such defendant,
and as if he had replied thereto denying all liability."
Does the above portion of the act make it possible for
a jury to find in favor of the plaintiff as against the addi-
tional defendant or are we bound by the doctrines as set
forth in the Vinnacombe and Pittsburgh Bank cases to the
effect that the plaintiff is not given any additional right and
that the issue created by the sci. fa. is strictly between the
two classes of defendants only?
The first case to raise this interesting question was that
of Graham v. Yellow Cab Co. et al.68 In this case, a tres-
pass action was brought in the State Court and the case
was removed to the District Court as a diversity of citizen-
ship case. In a very interesting opinion, Judge Dickinson
observed that the statute in question was open to either of
two constructions, reasoning as follows:
"It might be read that when one is sued to whom,
in case of a judgment against him, a third party is
liable over, such third party may be brought into the
original action as 'additional defendant' as if the
action had been brought against both' and if judgment
be rendered for the plaintiff, it might have been against
both or either defendant 'according to equitable prin-
ciples,' whatever this phrase may mean. When so
brought in, the 'additional defendant' would not be at
liberty to object that the plaintiff could not have joined
him as a defendant in the original action. The statute
might also be read as a procedure to try two issues in
one form of action; one raising the question of the lia-
bility of the original defendant to the plaintiff, and the
other the liability of the 'additional defendant' to the
original defendant. This would mean that there were
two actions calling for two verdicts and two judg-
ments."6 9
6816 D. & C. 238. Affirmed by Circuit Court of Appeals by opin-
ion of Judge Thompson October 24, 1932 in 61 Fed. 2nd, 666,
salbid. 239,
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The averment in the Graham case was that the addi-
tional defendant was alone responsible for the damage of
which the plaintiff complained.
By the express terms of the Act of 1931, Section 2.
amending the Act of 1929, an additional defendant may be
joined by scire facias although he is alone liable to plaintiff
for the cause of action declared on.
70
Truly an anomalous situation develops under the Act
of 1931 where the original defendant sci. fa.'s an additional
defendant alleging that the latter is solely liable to the plain-
tiff. The original defendant's own affidavit in effect avers
that he has no cause of action against the "additional de-
fendant." If the doctrine of the Vinnacombe case is applied,
the scire facias of the "additional defendant" makes two
actions, one of the plaintiff against the original defendant
alone, and the other an action over by the original defend-
dant against the "additional defendant" to recover in whole
or in part whatever the original defendant must pay to the
plaintiff. If the finding of fact in a case was that the
"additional defendant" was solely liable, obviously the
plaintiff could not recover against the original de-
fendant and under the reasoning in the Vinnacombe case
could not recover against the "additional defendant" be-
cause the plaintiff is not affected by the sci. Ia. proceedings
instituted by the original defendant.
If. however, he is an "additional defendant" in the
sense he would have been if made a defendant along with
the defendant named in the original suit, so that a verdict
might be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
original defendant or the additional defendant or both,
many of the difficulties confronting us would disappear.
7 1
The court adopted the first construction and applied
the classic interpretation of the Vinnacombe case to the Act
of 1931. Under this court's ruling, the plaintiff cannot have
verdict or judgment against the additional defendant. The
7OGraham v. Yellow Cab Co. et al., 16 D. & C. 238, 240, affirmed
in 61 Fed. 2nd, 666. (See note 67.)
71Graham v. Yellow Cab. Co., 16 D. & C. 238, 241. Affirmed in
61 Fed. 2nd, 666.
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court's ruling is based entirely upon the construction of the
Act of 1931 because the liability alleged against the addi-
tional defendant was that he was alone or solely responsible
for plaintiff's damages and it was impossible, as we have
already observed, to sci. fa. an additional defendant to the
record under the Act of 1929 on the ground of sole liabil-
ity.72 The court held that the Act of 1931 permitted this
ground for the issuance of the sci. fa. Judge Thompson
affirmed this opinion in the United States Circuit Court.
7
3
The same conclusion was again reached in Fisher v.
Yellow Cab Co. 74 in an opinion written by Judge Dickin-
son, author of the Graham case." We have already dis-
cussed this opinion in the light of a federal jurisdictional
problem. This case also interprets the Act of 1931 as being
bound by the Vinnacombe doctrine of two cases in one, the
first being the case of plaintiff versus original defendant, and
the later being the case between the two defendants.
On the other hand, it appears that the trial court in
Shaw et al. v. Megargee (et al.)7 6 construed the Act of 1931
under which the additional defendant had been brought
upon the record on the ground of sole liability, to permit the
trial of the case as if the plaintiffs had instituted their suit
against the original defendant and the additional defendant
as joint and several tort feasors on the apparent ground that
there could be no issue in controversy betweent the two de-
fendants.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was not called to
pass upon this matter because the additional defendant,
alleged to be solely liable, had been properly dismissed
from the case by the trial court where it appeared that the
claim against him was barred by the statute of limitations.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals in the case
of Yellow Cab Co. P. Rodgers et al," took special pains to
72See note 67.
ra61 Fed. 2nd, 666.
7416 D. & C. 251.
7516 D. & C. 238.
76307 Pa. 447.
7r61 Fed. 2nd, 729.
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set forth in its opinion that it was not deciding whether or
not the Act of 1931 permitted the determination of the case
between the plaintiff and the additional defendant. The
court stated as follows:
"We need not here consider whether the Act of
1931 makes it necessary for the trial court to submit
the case between the plaintiff and the additional de-
fendant to the jury since the plaintiff does not complain
of the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for
the additional defendant."
Certainly the express words of the amending act would
of themselves and if standing alone, permit the plaintiff to
have verdict and judgment directly against the additional
defendant. The Act of 1931 reads in part as follows:
the plaintiff may have verdict and judg-
ment or other relief against such additional defendant
to the same extent as if such defendant had been duly
summoned by the plaintiff and the statement of claim
had been amended to include such defendant, and as
if he had replied thereto denying all liability."
It is to be noted that the portion of the act above quot-
ed has attempted to dispose of the pleading requirements.
The act in itself makes a complete denial for the additional
defendant of all of the allegations of the plaintiff's state-
ment. Prior to the Act of 1931 the Pittsburgh Bank case
was authority that the additional defendant need not answer
the plaintiff's statement of claim. It is respectfully submit-
ted that no serious difficulties would be encountered by way
of pleadings were the Act of 1931 to be interpreted as giving
the plaintiff a direct right against the additional defendant.
Certainly the substantive law is not changed if the facts in
themselves warrant liability of the additional defendant to
the plaintiff.
Regardless of what the legislative intent was as ex-
pressed in the Act of 1929, it is submitted that the intent was
clearly expressed in the Act of 1931 to give this direct relief
both in matters of sole liability as well as joint liability.
While the only definite authorities on this matter are the
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Graham and Fisher cases,"' which applied the doctrine of the
Vinnacombe and Pittsburgh Bank cases to the Act of 1931
and prevented direct relief, it is submitted that the proper
interpretation of the Act of 1931 leads us to the contrary
result.
It is respectfully submitted that the doctrine of the
Vinnacombe and Pittsburgh Bank cases is not applicable to
the Act of 1931, especially to situations alleging sole liabil-
ity on the part of the additional defendant to the plaintiff.
Before the doctrine in these cases could be applied, it is
necessary for the original defendant to attempt to found his
action against the additional defendant on pure fiction.
When his praecipe alleges that the additional defendant is
solely liable to the plaintiff, he therebyprecludes any right
of action on his part against the additional defendant. If
in fact the additional defendant were solely liable to the
plaintiff, under the Vinnacornbe doctrine, verdict and judg-
ment would be rendered in favor of the original defendant,
and even though the additional defendant were in fact liable
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be prevented from re-
covering in that action against him but would have to in-
stitute a new action directly against the additional defend-
ant for the same facts that were adjudicated and bring
himself within the statute of limitations.
This is the very thing that the act attempts to avoid.
Its purpose is to prevent circuity of action, delays and hard-
ships, and to simply, directly and equitably determine a
case. Not only does it appear that the proper interpreta-
tion of the 1931 Act is to give the plaintiff his direct relief
against the additional defendant in matters of sole liability,
but in matters of joint liability against both original and
additional defendants as well.
The limitation as set forth in the case of Cohen v.
Philadelphia Rural Transit Co. et al.79 limiting the use of the
sci. fa. in matters of joint liability to tort feasors who stand
78Graham v. Yellow Cab. Co. et al., 16 D. & C. 238; Fisher v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 16 D. & C. 251.
7913D. & C. 465.
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on equal footing as far as standards of negligence are con-
cerned would also appear to be applicable to direct relief
that could be given the plaintiff in matters of joint liability.
It is submitted however that the Vinnacombe doctrine would
and should remain applicable to matters of liability over.
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